The Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement

All U.S. counties that have participated in the 287(g) program, with the most recent signings under the Trump Administration shown in orange. 

This project assesses the impact of the devolution of federal immigration policy to local jurisdictions under the 287(g) program. Since 2006, 287(g) agreements have deputized local law enforcement officials to act as federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, and the program has seen a dramatic resurgence under the Trump Administration, with participation increasing by nearly 50% in 2017.  

First, I show that counties that entered the 287(g) program shifted their enforcement priorities toward misdemeanor, license, and immigration-related offenses rather than high-level felonies. Second, I find that local law enforcement is a politicized process: 287(g) signings were significantly more likely to occur in sheriff election years — which are independent of the presidential election cycle — and the overall rate of immigration detainers as well as the rate of detainers that did not ultimately lead to a criminal charge or conviction also rose in those years. Finally, I find that changing local law enforcement practices had important downstream consequences: I document a dramatic rise in deportations originating in counties that entered the program, compared to broader national trends. Mirroring the patterns observed at the policing level, the proportion of deportations for immigration offenses alone, as opposed to felony convictions, rose in the wake of 287(g) agreements. 

This work is made possible by data and support from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University. 


The proliferation of Race to the Top policies after the competition is announced in 2009. 

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2017 [paper] [replication file]

Abstract: With increasing frequency, U.S. presidents have orchestrated relations between federal and state governments. A defining feature of this “executive federalism” is a pragmatic willingness to both borrow from and reconstitute very different types of past federalisms. A case in point is President Barack Obama’s Race to the Top (RttT) initiative, which sought to stimulate the adoption of specific education reforms in state governments around the country through a series of highly prescriptive but entirely voluntary policy competitions. This paper evaluates the results of such efforts. To do so, it draws on four original data sets: a nationally representative survey of state legislators, an analysis of State of the State speeches, another of state applications to the competitions themselves, and finally, an inventory of state policymaking trends in a range of education policies that were awarded under the competition. This paper then relies upon a variety of identification strategies to gauge the influence of RttT on the nation’s education policy landscape. Taken as a whole the evidence suggests that RttT, through both direct and indirect means, augmented the production of state policies that were central components of the president’s education agenda.

At-Large Elections Revisited: The Contingent and Causal Effects of Reform on Local Minority Representation

with Carolyn Abott

[latest version

Abstract: Despite a long history of legal challenges alleging that elections conducted at-large suppress minority representation, this remains the dominant electoral system in local governments throughout the United States. Moreover, a large empirical literature remains divided over the present-day impact of at-large elections on the political success of underrepresented groups. We reconcile the competing findings in this literature by providing contingent, causal estimates of the effect of conversion from at-large to by-trustee area elections on minority officeholding, using a novel identification strategy afforded by the California Voting Rights Act of 2001. We find a dramatic positive effect of conversion in districts where the Latino minority is sufficiently large and geographically concentrated; where there is a large income disparity between the minority and the majority; and where the minority reaches a relatively high level on selected socioeconomic indicators. When these conditions are not satisfied, we consistently see null estimated effects.


Redistricting map for the city of Watsonville, CA, one of the first in the state to legally strike down at-large elections. 

Strategic Abstention, Missing Data, and Ideal Point Estimation

with Sepehr Shahshahani

Our estimator samples legislators’ utilities from the center of the distribution for strategic abstentions, and from the entire distribution for those that are truly random. 

Ideal point estimation is a landmark contribution in political science, allowing scholars to use roll call votes to measure legislators’ ideological positions. Most statistical procedures for estimating ideal points assume that abstentions are missing at random, which can be unwarranted and misleading. A case in point are legislatures with absolute voting rules, where bills must receive support from a majority of the seats in the chamber, not those present and voting, in order to pass. Using roll call data from the California State Assembly, we show that under absolute voting, abstentions generally behave more like no votes than yes votes. We then propose an alternative utility framework that conceives of abstention as a strategic choice in the action space of legislators. Finally, we are developing a new method that proceeds in two stages: first, using covariates to separate systematic from random abstention, and second, performing Markov Chain Monte Carlo estimation of ideal points with three rather than two choice categories. 

Poster presented at the 2016 Society for Political Methodology available here

The Tools of Executive Federalism: How Obama’s Race to the Top Refashioned State Policymaking

with William Howell 

More bills related to Race to the Top policies were introduced, and passed, in the California State Assembly after the start of the competition, and they did so with less bipartisan support. 

This paper investigates how presidents influence state policymaking processes over which they exercise no formal authority. Focusing on Barack Obama’s Race to the Top Initiative, we evaluate the president’s ability to leverage two resources - money and attention - in order to advance a policy agenda that stood no chance of enactment in Congress. We argue, on the one hand, that the president has a unique set of tools and abilities to place policies on legislative agendas and coordinate diffuse interests in service of his goals. However, presidential attention also comes with a price: we find evidence of increased partisan polarization within those areas of education policy where Obama intervened. 

Applications of a New Automated Redistricting Simulator

with Ben Fifield, Kosuke Imai, and James Lo

In this project, we explore the extent, institutional determinants, and democratic implications of partisan gerrymandering across the U.S. states. To do so, we apply a new algorithm proposed by Fifield, Higgins, Imai, and Tarr (2016), which is the first simulation-based approach that can generate feasible districting maps with statistical properties, subject to substantive constraints required by redistricting processes in the real world. 

Our method allows us to compare the Democratic vote share under the current districting plan to what we would observe across the distribution of all possible plans that satisfy legal constraints.